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Ignoring Purpose, Context, and History: The Tenth 
Circuit Court in American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All Americans have or will encounter a public display including 
religious imagery during their lives. Many of our most recognized 
memorials use religious symbols as the primary or exclusive element 
in displays honoring heroes who made the ultimate sacrifice 
protecting everything we hold dear.1 Such displays are scattered 
throughout American communities, which, due to aggressive 
challenges to the constitutionality of these displays, increasingly face 
a choice between removing the displays or fighting expensive legal 
battles brought by advocates of strict separation of church and state.2 
In American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals faced such a challenge and held that thirteen memorials that 
used a white Latin cross to honor fallen Utah State Troopers 
unconstitutionally endorsed Christianity.3 Because the court 
misinterpreted and misapplied its own precedent4 in analyzing the 
history and context of the monuments and discounted the 
importance of the monuments’ court-recognized secular purpose 
without explanation,5 Duncan was wrongly decided and should be 
reversed. 
Part II of this Note reviews the context and history of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part III details the facts, 
procedural history, and holding of Duncan. Part IV analyzes 
Duncan; it discusses how the court misinterpreted and misapplied its 
own precedent by downplaying the secular context of the memorials 
at issue, erroneously discounting the weight of a recognized secular 
purpose in creating the memorials and giving too little weight to 
Utah’s own religious treatment of the Latin cross. Part V concludes. 
 
 1. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). The memorial at Arlington and 
Irish Brigade Monument at Gettysburg National Military Park are but two examples. Id.  
 2. Paul Forster, Note, Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as 
Cures for Establishment Clause Violations, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 401, 402 (2010). 
 3. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 4. See Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 5. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159–64. 
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II. CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”6 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
was originally understood by some Founders and early courts merely 
to prohibit a federally established church—one funded and favored 
by the government with authority to coerce membership in and 
compliance with that religion’s practices and tenets.7 Modern 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence only started evolving in the 
1940s, when the clause was made applicable to the states by 
Cantwell v. Connecticut.8 Seven years later the court decided Everson 
v. Board of Education, which held:  
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church[,] . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another[,] . . . force [or] 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against 
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations . . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of 
separation between church and State.”9 
  
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While a detailed evolution of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is not provided in this article, it is available in Supreme Court decisions. E.g., 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425–30 (1962). Instead, this article will highlight various 
important decisions tracing Establishment Clause history. For a more complete history of the 
Establishment Clause, see generally Rodney K. Smith, Getting off on the Wrong Foot and Back 
Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
569 (1984). 
 7. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Terrett 
v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815)); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20–21; Smith, supra note 6, at 575–634. 
 8. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  
 9. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). 
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Everson laid the foundation for various later Establishment 
Clause rationales, including neutrality,10 coercion,11 strict 
separation,12 endorsement,13 and entanglement.14 
Even with Everson as a foundation, the Court adopted no single 
framework to analyze Establishment Clause challenges until 1971 in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.15 The “Lemon test,” as it is now commonly 
known, assessed whether the challenged government action: (1) had 
a secular purpose, (2) had the “principal or primary effect” of either 
“advanc[ing] [or] inhibit[ing] religion,” and whether it (3) 
“foster[s] an excessive government entanglement with religion.”16 
Government action that fails any of the prongs is an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.17 Lemon was almost immediately criticized, 
even by its author, Chief Justice Burger, and the Court abandoned 
Lemon until 1984—when it was reestablished as the primary 
Establishment Clause framework.18 
Courts have continued to refine and clarify Lemon’s prongs since 
1984. The purpose prong asks whether the government’s “actual 
purpose” is approval or disapproval of a religion and assesses whether 
the government’s intent in taking the action—in the eyes of a 
reasonable observer—was secular.19 It is not required that the 
purpose be exclusively secular; rather, it is simply required that the 
government show a “plausible secular purpose” behind its action.20 
The effect prong asks whether a reasonable observer would 
believe that the effect of the action advances or inhibits religion or 
endorses a religious message. The reasonable observer is deemed to 
have knowledge of the purpose, history, and context of the action in 
 
 10. McConnell, supra note 7, at 8 (citing Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 382 (1985)). 
 11. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430–31 (holding that allowing school prayers is coercive in 
nature). 
 12. McConnell, supra note 7, at 13 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 11). 
 13. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989). 
 14. Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–93, 599 (1992) (detailing the government’s 
involvement in a graduation prayer). 
 15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 16. Id. at 612–613. 
 17. Id.  
 18. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1–3. 
 19. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
 20. Bauchman v. Wi. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74–75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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question, and assesses the action in light of that knowledge.21 In this 
sense, the reasonable observer is similar to tort law’s reasonable 
person, and is presumed to know far more than most actual members 
of a community,22 although he or she is not presumed to be 
omniscient.23 
Finally, entanglement is generally only found if the government 
“involves itself with a recognized religious activity or institution,”24 
or provides financial aid to sectarian institutions.25 
Despite Lemon’s visibility among the Establishment Clause tests, 
the current Supreme Court applies no single test and Justice Breyer 
declared in a recent case that there is “no single mechanical formula 
that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every 
[Establishment Clause] case.”26 Indeed, the court has declined to 
apply Lemon in at least one recent high-profile case.27 Some on the 
court have criticized Lemon’s prongs as being no more helpful than 
“signposts” in identifying Establishment Clause violations.28 In spite 
of, or perhaps because of, the current uncertainty surrounding the 
appropriate analytical framework for Establishment Clause contests, 
at least two circuit courts of appeals have explicitly held that Lemon is 
binding precedent and appear to be committed to using the test 
until the Supreme Court clearly establishes an alternative.29 
III. AMERICAN ATHEISTS, INC. V. DUNCAN 
In Duncan, the Tenth Circuit held that thirteen twelve-foot tall 
crosses honoring fallen Utah State Troopers violated the effect prong 
of the Lemon test and thus were an unconstitutional establishment of 
 
 21. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (internal citation omitted). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158–59 (internal citation omitted). 
 24. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260 (D. Utah 2007) (citing 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971)). 
 25. Id. (citing Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
 26. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. (noting several recent decisions in which the Court declined to apply Lemon at 
all or applied it only after reaching a holding using other tests). 
 28. Id. at 686 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). 
 29. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
Lemon still controls all Establishment Clause cases in the Tenth Circuit); Card v. Everett, 520 
F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Lemon remained the general test for Establishment 
Clause violations, but that Van Orden controlled some cases involving long-standing religious 
displays conveying historical messages in a non-secular context). 
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religion.30 This section reviews Duncan’s facts, procedural history, 
and holding. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
On December 8, 1974,31 Utah Highway Trooper Anthony J. 
Antoniewicz was ambushed and killed while on patrol near the Utah-
Wyoming border.32 Lee Perry, then president of the Utah Highway 
Patrol Association (“UHPA”)—a nonprofit and nonreligious 
organization—learned that no memorial program existed to honor 
fallen state troopers,33 and with his friend Robert Kirby conceived of 
a memorial to honor the trooper.34 The memorial consisted of a 
twelve-foot high white Latin cross with Trooper Antoniewicz’s 
name, rank, and badge number in large black lettering across the six-
foot long cross-bar; a twelve-inch by sixteen-inch depiction of the 
Utah Highway Patrol’s (“UHP”) official insignia; and a plaque 
containing a picture of the trooper with biographical information 
placed below.35 After the initial memorial was in place, “families of 
other fallen troopers contacted the UHPA” requesting similar 
monuments for their fallen loved ones.36 Eventually, thirteen 
memorials were constructed (some on private land, some on public), 
including two placed on public land outside a UHP office.37 
Perry and Kirby were inspired to use a white Latin cross by the 
white crosses used in military cemeteries to honor fallen soldiers.38 
They believed that “only the white [Latin] cross could effectively 
convey the simultaneous messages of death, honor, remembrance, 
gratitude, sacrifice, and safety” they intended. The designers 
expected viewers to recognize the cross as a memorial honoring 
those who had “given their lives to ensure the safety and protection 
 
 30. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158, 1164. 
 31. 1970 - 1979 / Trooper William J. Antoniewicz, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY: HIGHWAY PATROL, http://publicsafety.utah.gov/highwaypatrol/history_1979/ 
antoniewicz.html (last visited January 17, 2011). 
 32. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247 (D. Utah 2007). 
 33. Id. at 1248. 
 34. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1148. 
 35. Id. at 1150. Images of the memorials are attached to the opinion. Id. at 1165–67. 
 36. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. The UHPA stated that it would use any symbol 
the family requested, although no family had objected to the use of a cross, Duncan, 616 F.3d 
at 1151, despite the State’s disagreement on that point, id. at 1151 n.2.  
 37. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151. 
 38. Id. at 1157. 
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of others.”39 According to the UHPA, the memorials’ purposes are 
to: (1) remind UHPA families and UHP troopers “that a fellow 
trooper gave his live in service of [the] state”; (2) “remind . . . 
drivers that a trooper died in order to make the state safe for all 
citizens”; (3) “honor the trooper and the sacrifice he and his family 
made for the State of Utah”; and (4) “encourage safe conduct on 
the highways.”40 In order to convey the messages to passers-by, the 
memorials were placed in visible locations that were both close to the 
spot of the trooper’s death and “safe to stop and view.”41 
American Atheists, Inc., along with three individual Utah 
residents who were also members of the group, brought suit 
challenging the legality of the monuments. On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, Judge David Sam held the memorials 
constitutional under the Tenth Circuit’s revised three-prong Lemon 
test.42 He ruled that the “undisputed material facts allow the court to 
discern a plausible secular purpose . . . of honoring UHP troopers 
who died during their term of service,”43 that the “reasonable 
observer” with knowledge of the context and history of the 
memorials and the demographics of Utah would not perceive an 
effect of religious endorsement,44 and that the use of the cross as a 
memorial was not excessive entanglement.45 The plaintiffs timely 
appealed. 
B. Holding 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. While it agreed 
that the memorials had a secular purpose, it found that they had the 
impermissible effect of conveying a religious message, and therefore 
failed Lemon’s effect prong.46  
 
 39. Id. at 1151. 
 40. Id. at 1150. 
 41. Id. at 1151. 
 42. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254, 1260–61 (D. Utah 
2007). 
 43. Id. at 1254. 
 44. Id. at 1258 (referencing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 45. Id. at 1260–61. 
 46. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158–59, 1164. The court did not analyze whether there was 
excessive entanglement. 
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The court initially noted that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court is 
sharply divided on the [governing] standard . . . the touchstone for 
Establishment Clause analysis [in the Tenth Circuit] remains the 
tripartite test set out in Lemon.”47 Under the purpose prong, the 
court “asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion”48—i.e., “whether the government conduct 
was motivated by an intent to endorse religion.”49 The court reviews 
the government’s conduct under this prong through the eyes of an 
“‘objective observer,’”50 but does not “lightly attribute 
unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where [it] 
can discern a plausible secular purpose,”51 unless the purported 
motive appears to be merely a sham.52 
The court held that Utah’s action did not violate the purpose 
prong. The “consistently asserted” purpose of the State throughout 
the project had been one of “honor[ing] fallen state troopers and . . . 
promot[ing] safety on its highways.”53 Further, UHPA’s claim of a 
secular motive was bolstered by the fact that the design of the 
memorials was inspired by military memorials that also used a white 
Latin cross, and also by the fact that both designers were members of 
the Mormon faith, which “does not use the cross as a religious 
symbol.”54 Finally, there was no evidence that the purported motive 
was a sham.55 
Next, under the effect prong, the court “asks whether . . . the 
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or 
disapproval”56 in “the eyes of an objective observer who is aware of 
 
 47. Id. at 1156 (citations omitted) (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 
568 F.3d 784, 796 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a brief summary 
of the Lemon test’s prongs, see supra notes 15–25 and accompanying text. 
 48. Id. at 1157 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 49. Id. (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 
2008)). 
 50. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031). 
 51. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031). 
 52. See id. at 1158. 
 53. Id. at 1157.  
 54. Id. The court noted that the Establishment Clause only applies to state actors, 
which the UHPA is not. However, it deemed the memorials “state action” and imputed 
UHPA’s motives to the State because the State had allowed the use of UHP insignia and had 
located several memorials on public land. Id. at 1157–58. 
 55. Id. at 1158. 
 56. Id. at 1157 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
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the purpose, context, and history of the symbol.”57 This observer is 
presumed to be aware of contextual and historical information 
beyond what is “gleaned simply from viewing the challenged 
display,”58 but is not presumed to be omniscient.59 The court 
considers the purpose, context, and history of the action to 
determine whether the action would have the effect of 
“communicating a message of governmental endorsement or 
disapproval” of religion,60 or of “mak[ing] adherence to a religion 
relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the political community.”61 
In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s 
use of the cross as a memorial conveyed a message of religious 
endorsement.62 While the State’s purpose in allowing the use of the 
UHP insignia and public land was secular, it was outweighed by the 
effect of the memorial’s context and history.63 The cross—“the 
preeminent symbol of Christianity,”64 and one that, in the context of 
the monument, “[stood] alone (as opposed to . . . being part of 
some sort of display involving other symbols)”65—sent a message not 
merely of death, but of the death of a Christian.66 Thus, the court 
reasoned, the reasonable observer would likely experience “fear of 
unequal treatment” by UHP troopers,67 and “could reasonably 
assume that the officers were Christian police”68 because the cross 
bore the official UHP insignia—the state’s “imprimatur”—and was 
on public land.69  
 
concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 57. Id. at 1158 (emphasis added) (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 
1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that this 
observer “is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort law.” Id. (quoting 
Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031). 
 58. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 1159. 
 60. Id. at 1158 (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 799 
(10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Id. (quoting Green, 568 F.3d at 799). 
 62. Id. at 1164. 
 63. Id. at 1159. The court analyzed the context and history together because there was 
no history separate from the context in this case. Id. at 1159 n.11. 
 64. Id. at 1160 (quoting Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1161. 
 67. Id. at 1160. 
 68. Id. at 1161 (quoting Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th 
Cir. 1985)). 
 69. Id. at 1160. 
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The court went on to dismiss four secular contextual factors 
raised by the State. First, it rejected the contention that the crosses’ 
use as memorials nullified their religious message because the cross 
was a “Christian symbol of death”70 and had not obtained a secular 
meaning apart from its religious meaning.71 Second, it rejected the 
contention that because crosses are common roadside memorials, the 
UHPA memorials conveyed the secular message of honoring the 
death of one fallen near the area.72 It also noted the use of the UHP 
insignia and the size of the cross was unique among roadside 
memorials.73 Third, the fact that the designers did not revere the 
cross was inconsequential because the State adopted the memorials 
as its own, thus engaging in expressive activity likely altering the 
effect on the observer.74 Finally, the court noted that the fact that 
the majority of Utahns belong to the Mormon religion, which does 
not revere the cross, and that only a small minority belonged to 
religions revering the cross, did not mitigate the endorsement effect, 
because it is not inconceivable the State could endorse a minority 
religion.75 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Part analyzes the Duncan holding and determines that the 
Tenth Circuit incorrectly found an impermissible effect of religious 
endorsement under Lemon. First, it misinterpreted and misapplied its 
own precedent76 and ignored a likely Supreme Court majority77 in 
 
 70. Id. at 1161. 
 71. Id. at 1161–62. 
 72. Id. at 1162. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1163. 
 75. Id. at 1163–64 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64 
(1989)). 
 76. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1033–34 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the city’s name, derived from its history as the location of a “forest of crosses” 
used to memorialize those massacred in the area, “militate[d] against the argument that the 
symbol’s effect is to endorse Christianity”). 
 77. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion). In 
Salazar, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, found that a cross 
used as a symbol in a memorial “evokes far more than religion” and was not “an attempt to set 
the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.” Id. at 1816, 1820. While Justices Scalia and 
Thomas joined the judgment while deciding the case on other grounds, it is almost certain 
they would join the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy and Alito in this finding, considering 
their stance in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., 
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holding that the cross, even when used as a memorial to honor fallen 
troopers, would convey a message of state imprimatur of 
Christianity. Second, it downplayed the importance of the contextual 
factors that secularized the message sent by the UPHA memorials.78 
Third, it discounted, without explanation, the weight of the State’s 
secular purpose contrary to the approach generally taken by the 
Supreme Court.79 Finally, it gave insufficient weight to the 
secularizing effect of Utah’s demographics,80 especially in light of the 
strong secular message conveyed by the use of the cross as a 
memorial. 
A. The Memorial as an Imprimatur of the State 
The Court insisted that despite the context of the crosses as 
memorials for fallen state troopers, the cross stands alone without 
secularizing features, and by bearing the UHP symbol, would cause 
“fear of unequal treatment” on a religious basis in the mind of a 
reasonable observer.81 However, in light of its own decision in 
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, which Duncan cites approvingly, 
the memorials are clearly secular in nature and cannot conceivably 
create greater risk of imprimatur than the cross-bearing city seal used 
by Las Cruces in Weinbaum, because the symbols share a context 
and history that makes the message of the cross “not religious at 
all.”82  
In Weinbaum, the City of Las Cruces, New Mexico chose as its 
seal the symbol of three crosses, the middle one raised above the 
others, with all three surrounded by a sunburst.83 The symbol was 
used on city buildings, fire trucks and police cars, fire and police 
uniforms, maintenance vehicles, and embodied in a sculpture on the 
exterior of the city sports complex and in a mural in an elementary 
school.84 Despite its recognition that the cross is “unequivocally” 
 
concurring separately). 
 78. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1162. 
 79. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592–94 (finding an eighteen-foot tall menorah 
displayed just outside the city-county building did not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion). 
 80. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163. 
 81. Id. at 1160. 
 82. Id. at 1159 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1035 (10th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 83. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1025 n.7. 
 84. Id. at 1025–26. 
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Christian, and that the three cross symbol represented the crucifixion 
of Christ, the central figure of Christianity,85 the Weinbaum court 
held that there was no religious effect because the symbol “was not 
religious at all,” being derived from “secular events” surrounding the 
city’s founding.86 
The Tenth Circuit in Duncan attempted to distinguish 
Weinbaum on the basis of the “secular” context and history of the 
Las Cruces cross.87 What it failed to mention, however, was that the 
“secular” events from which Las Cruces derived its name—and thus 
from which the seal derives its history and context—was the 
construction of a rough cross to memorialize the massacre of 
Mexican soldiers in 1847, as well as a “forest of crosses” later left to 
mark the graves of fallen travelers in the area.88 Weinbaum 
distinguished the Las Cruces seal from a similar seal used by another 
city in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners, in which the 
Tenth Circuit held that a city seal violated the Establishment Clause 
by creating a state imprimatur of religion because including the cross 
on the seal was an attempt to honor the city’s Christian history.89  
It becomes apparent in analyzing Weinbaum and Friedman that 
what distinguishes the two cases—and made Las Cruces’s use 
secular—was that in Weinbaum the cross’s context derived from its 
history as a memorial. Friedman clarifies that celebrating history by 
itself is not necessarily secular, but that the history celebrated must 
be secular. Thus, in holding that Las Cruces’s cross-bearing seal was 
secular, and “had no religious effect” because it was derived from 
“secular” events surrounding the city’s founding, Weinbaum at least 
implicitly recognized that memorializing fallen soldiers and travelers, 
even with an “unequivocally” Christian symbol, was secular.90 
 
 85. Id. at 1022–23. 
 86. Id. at 1035. 
 87. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159. 
 88. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1024. 
 89. Id. at 1034 (citing Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779, 781 
(10th Cir. 1985)). The area was conquered by Spanish conquistadors accompanied by Catholic 
priests. Id. (citing Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781). Although the court notes that the motto, 
“With This [the cross] We Overcome,” also suggested a state imprimatur of religion, it is 
apparent that the court would likely have held the seal unconstitutional even without the 
motto, because the purported secular purpose was in fact to honor its religious founding. See 
id.  
 90. The fact that the seal was derived from the city’s name, id. at 1035, and that crosses 
were used throughout the city in commercial and secular contexts, id. at 1034, is 
inconsequential. Those facts derive from the same secular history—the use of the cross as a 
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In so doing, the court is in good company, as a majority of the 
Supreme Court would almost certainly agree that use of a Latin cross 
to honor those giving their lives defending our liberties is secular in 
nature. Indeed, three justices, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have spoken directly on point.91 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality in Salazar v. Buono, stated 
that “[p]lacement of [an eight-foot tall] cross on Government-
owned land was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on 
a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended 
simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”92 He further stated 
that “[a] cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, 
the place where a state trooper perished need not be taken as a 
statement of governmental support for sectarian beliefs.”93 Instead, 
“a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. . . . 
[O]ne Latin cross in the desert evokes . . . thousands of small crosses 
in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, 
battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are 
forgotten.”94  
While Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join the plurality 
opinion, both have made statements in prior opinions that support 
the assertion that they would join the other three justices in holding 
that use of a Latin cross to commemorate fallen heroes is not 
unconstitutional. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a stand-alone Ten Commandments monument 
that was part of a scattered display of historical monuments and 
markers spread over twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas State 
Capitol Building.95 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote 
separately stating that “there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s 
favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and 
acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the 
Ten Commandments.”96 Justice Thomas went further in his 
concurring opinion, arguing against incorporation of the 
 
memorial. Had the court determined the memorials were religious in nature because of the use 
of the cross, there would have been no basis for distinguishing the case from Friedman. 
 91. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816–17, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 92. Id. at 1816–17. 
 93. Id. at 1818. 
 94. Id. at 1820. 
 95. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 691–92 (2005). 
 96. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Establishment Clause against the states, and arguing that even if it 
were incorporated, the Establishment Clause should be given its 
original meaning, which required “actual legal coercion” 97 such as 
“mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting 
ministers,”98 but “[t]he mere presence of the monument . . . involves 
no coercion and . . . does not violate the Establishment Clause.”99 
Taken together, these statements indicate that there is a likely five-
justice majority that would support the proposition that use of the 
Latin cross as part of a memorial to honor fallen state troopers does 
not constitute an unconstitutional state imprimatur of religion. 
Because the crosses used in Duncan share a secular pedigree with 
those used in Weinbaum based on their use as memorials, the 
Duncan court misapplied and misinterpreted Weinbaum in holding 
that the use of the cross as a memorial in Duncan was religious. It 
also becomes clear that if the cross’s use on the city seal did not 
create an effect of fear of imprimatur of religion or of unequal 
treatment by “Christian police” in Weinbaum—where the seal was 
emblazoned on police uniforms, displayed on public buildings, 
represented by a seven-and-one-half-foot tall sculpture at the city 
sports complex, and painted on the wall of an elementary school—
because of its secular nature, it certainly could not create that effect 
in a reasonable observer in Duncan where a mere thirteen crosses 
scattered throughout the state carry the UHP insignia, as an integral 
and necessary part of a memorial to honor fallen UHP troopers. 
Indeed, in light of the shared context with Weinbaum, a reasonable 
observer, aware of the context of the UHPA crosses as memorials, 
would almost certainly consider the effect “not religious at all.”100 
B. The Context of the Crosses as Integral Parts of Memorials 
Even if the Tenth Circuit finds that a Latin cross used as a 
memorial honoring the fallen retains some religious meaning, despite 
its implicit holding in Weinbaum to the contrary,101 the reasonable 
observer would almost certainly find that whatever incidental 
 
 97. Id. 693 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 98. Id. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 99. Id. at 694. 
 100. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 101. See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text. 
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religious effect remains is overcome by the secular context in which 
the cross is presented.102 
The Duncan court gave three reasons regarding the context in 
which the cross was presented that it claimed would purvey an 
impermissible effect of endorsement. First, it claimed the cross was a 
“stand alone” symbol, lacking any predominating secular message.103 
Second, it argued that the cross had not been accepted by other 
religions as a symbol of death and thus remained a Christian symbol 
of death.104 Third, it expressed concern regarding the size and 
location of the symbols, especially those located near the UHP 
offices.105 
First, the Duncan court erroneously discounted the context in 
which the cross is found when claiming it “stands alone.”106 As the 
images attached to the opinion illustrate,107 the trooper’s name is 
prominently displayed, and the picture and biographical information 
are clearly visible (even if potentially merely a blur by those passing 
by at 55 miles per hour).108 Further, the use of the UHP insignia 
adds to the secular context of the memorial rather than implying 
religious endorsement.109 The crosses in the UHP memorials have 
never “stood alone” as a Christian symbol, nor been used in any way 
to suggest religious endorsement; rather, they have always been an 
integral part of a memorial honoring fallen UHP troopers.110 Use of 
the UHP insignia is almost necessary—and certainly fitting—on 
memorials honoring fallen state troopers. Rather than implying 
government imprimatur, the UHP symbol contributes to a 
 
 102. Indeed, the cross would almost certainly retain some religious meaning. See Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion) (noting that a Ten Commandments monument 
retains a religious aspect, even though in the circumstances it could send a secular message as 
well). However, whatever meaning remains would likely be merely incidental, and merely 
incidental endorsement of religion where government action has a clearly secular effect does 
not violate the constitution. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“[N]ot every law 
that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, 
constitutionally invalid.” (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 103. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1162. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. at 1162 n.14. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1165–67. 
 108. Id. at 1162 n.14. 
 109. See id.  
 110. Id.  
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predominant secular message by clearly identifying the honored 
fallen as UHP troopers.111 
This conclusion is bolstered by distinguishing a recentlydecided 
comparable case, Trunk v. City of San Diego, which held the use of a 
Latin cross at the center of a veteran’s memorial an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.112 The forty-three-foot tall cross (when 
including the base) used in the Trunk WWI and WWII memorial sat 
alone atop Mount Soledad, just outside of San Diego, California 
from 1913 to 1954,113 and was originally an “emblem of faith.”114 In 
1954 the cross was dedicated as a war memorial, but it was not until 
1989, after litigation surrounding the cross had started, that a plaque 
was added identifying the cross as a war memorial.115 During 
ongoing legal challenges, the organizers added several new features, 
including a bronze plaque, six large walls displaying the engraved 
names of fallen veterans, formal memorial plaques each containing 
biographies of fallen veterans, and an American flag among other 
items. Despite these secularizing additions, the use of the cross was 
held unconstitutional under the California Constitution in 1991.116 
In order to avoid having to remove the memorial, it was eventually 
taken by the federal Congress in 2006.117 While the Ninth Circuit 
noted the primarily religious nature of the cross, it acknowledged 
that its nature did not preclude the cross from having a secular 
meaning, but instead stated that its holding was “driven by the 
history, setting, and appearance of [the Mount Soledad Cross] 
that . . . sharply distinguish the Cross from other war memorials 
containing religious symbols.”118 
Unlike the cross in Trunk, the crosses at issue in Duncan have 
never stood alone as emblems of faith or been used frequently as the 
site of religious services. Rather, the crosses at issue in Duncan have 
always contained secular features such as a bronze plaque (and 
insignia of the state), pictures and biographical information of the 
 
 111. As noted supra notes 91–99, it seems almost certain a Supreme Court majority 
would agree with this proposition. 
 112. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 113.  Id. at *2. 
 114. Id. at *56. 
 115. Id. at *56–57. 
 116. Id. at *8 (citing Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (S.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 117. Id. at *11–12. 
 118. Id. at *43–44.  
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fallen, and a conspicuous display of the name of the fallen trooper.119 
Further, as the reasonable observer would certainly be aware, the 
UHPA has clearly stated that any symbol requested by the fallen 
trooper’s family would be used upon request, which could not have 
been the case in Trunk due to the permanent nature of the cross.120 
Thus, unlike the cross at issue in Trunk, the crosses at issue in 
Duncan have always been the centerpiece of a fully integrated 
memorial honoring fallen troopers, conveying a primarily secular 
message to a reasonable observer.  
Second, while it may be true that the cross remains a 
“predominately Christian symbol,”121 it is “not exclusively so.”122 
More importantly, a reasonable observer, even if not embracing the 
cross, would surely recognize its non-secular use as a symbol of 
death123—especially when used to honor fallen heroes. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has noted: 
[A] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It 
is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic 
acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an 
honored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, [the 
Latin cross] evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of 
small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who 
fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen 
are forgotten.124 
The Court went on to state that “[a] cross by the side of a public 
highway marking, for instance, the place where a state trooper 
perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support 
for sectarian beliefs.”125 As noted earlier, the Tenth Circuit is in 
 
 119. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 120. Id. at 1151. 
 121. Id. at 1162. 
 122. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1023 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he cross is an oft-used symbol in other cultures and religions as well.” (citing 5 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3434 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2005))); see also 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF RELIGION 9339 (noting that the cross can be viewed as a symbol of the tree of life). 
 123. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *77–78 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). The district court also noted 
that when used as a monument, “the crosses . . . symbolize the cost of war, sacrifice and 
honor, and repose in death—specifically, military death.” Id. at 1213. 
 124. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (plurality opinion). The statement 
was not central to the Court’s holding. 
 125. Id. at 1818. 
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agreement with the Supreme Court, already having at least implicitly 
recognized that the cross, when used to memorialize fallen heroes, 
sends a primarily secular, not religious message.126 Thus, contrary to 
the Duncan court’s decision, it is likely that the reasonable observer 
would perceive a secular message of honoring sacrifice, not a 
religious one of a Christian death. 
Finally, the court’s concern about the size of the memorials and 
the placement of the two crosses in front of the UHP offices is 
unnecessary given that the cross is clearly a memorial to fallen state 
troopers. The twelve-foot high crosses at issue in this case are 
dwarfed by the forty-three-foot cross found unconstitutional in 
Trunk, and the vast majority of the crosses occupy no place nearly so 
prominent as the cross in Trunk.127 Further, the crosses’ size is not 
substantially larger than the seven-and-one-half-foot tall sculpture 
the Tenth Circuit found constitutional in Weinbaum, and the 
location cannot be problematic in view of the fact that the city seal in 
Weinbaum was not even across the street from the city buildings as it 
was in Duncan—it was on the government buildings, inside an 
elementary school, and on nearly all other city property.128 
C. The Purpose of the Memorials 
The Duncan court discounted the importance of the 
government’s purpose in analyzing effect—contrary to its own stated 
approach and that of the Supreme Court—without sufficient 
explanation. The court acknowledged that the State erected the 
UPHA memorials with a clearly secular purpose, but it did little 
more than note that the purpose was secular, that it was not 
dispositive, and that it had to be considered in light of other 
contextual and historical factors.129 This approach stands in stark 
contrast to the importance the Tenth Circuit purported to attach to 
purpose in analyzing effects, noting that “‘[e]ffects are most often 
the manifestation of a motivating purpose.’”130 
 
 126. See discussion supra section IV.A. 
 127. Trunk, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *69, *71–72 (noting that the cross 
“dominated” the physical setting of the memorial, and occupied the “highest point” in a 
“place of particular prominence in San Diego”). 
 128. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 129. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 130. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1033).  
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The court’s approach also contrasts with the Supreme Court’s 
approach in two recent cases, Van Orden v. Perry131 and McCreary 
County v. ACLU,132 where purpose carried substantial weight in the 
effect prong and in large part explains the different outcomes. The 
five-justice majority in McCreary held that Ten Commandment 
displays put up in two Kentucky county courthouses were 
unconstitutional.133 The Court gave dispositive weight to the 
government’s improper and “unmistakable” religious purpose (both 
in the purpose analysis and in the effects analysis) in finding the 
displays unconstitutional.134  
In Van Orden, a decision issued on the same day, Justice Breyer, 
who voted with the majority in McCreary, cast his vote with the 
McCreary dissenters. In a separate concurrence, he found a 
standalone Ten Commandments display on the Texas State Capitol 
Grounds constitutional,135 at least in part because of the 
government’s secular purpose in erecting the display.136 While he 
refused to base his decision on any single test, he argued that the 
display might pass both the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon 
test if the majority had chosen to apply it, at least in part due to the 
government’s secular purpose.137  
 
 131.  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 132.  545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 133.  Id. at 850–51.  
 134.  Id. While the Court frames its decision in terms of the purpose prong of the Lemon 
test, id. (“We hold that the counties’ manifest objective may be dispositive of the 
constitutional enquiry . . . .”), it engages in substantial analysis of effects in the eyes of the 
reasonable observer, id. at 869 (“The reasonable observer could only think that the Counties 
meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message.” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. at 872 (“No reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties 
had cast off the [religious] objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.” (emphasis added)), 
leading to the inference that the effects prong—and the analysis of purpose as part of the 
effects prong—played a significant role in the Court’s decision. 
 135. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (plurality opinion). While the court does not describe 
the display as “standalone,” and Justice Breyer places some weight on the fact that the 
monument is an integrated part of other non-religious displays, id. at 702 (Breyer, J., 
concurring), the fact remains that the display, for all practical purposes, stands alone, as it 
shares “no common appearance” or apparent relation to any of the seventeen other displays on 
the twenty-two acre grounds where the displays were found, id. at 742 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The circumstances surrounding the display’s 
placement on the capitol grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended  
. . . nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to predominate.” (emphasis added)). 
 137. Id. at 703. 
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In light of its own statements and the apparent weight that the 
legislatures’ purposes received in both McCreary and Van Orden, the 
Tenth Circuit gave too little weight to the State’s undeniably secular 
purpose in choosing to include the cross in its fully integrated 
memorial. In McCreary, the government’s unmistakable religious 
purpose was dispositive in the Court’s finding of 
unconstitutionality.138 In Van Orden, Justice Breyer cast the deciding 
vote in favor of constitutionality—giving the government’s secular 
purpose substantial weight.139 However, the Tenth Circuit in 
Duncan does little more than mention government purpose in 
passing when analyzing the effects prong.140 It found that the 
religious nature of the Cross (which is, admittedly, the primary 
element of the memorial) overcame the secular government purpose 
and conveyed an endorsement effect despite the secularizing features 
of the other elements of the fully integrated memorial.141 Further, it 
discounted the context and history of the memorials given Utah’s 
religious demographics.142 This combined context and history is 
arguably even more secularizing—and thus should have made it even 
harder to overcome a secular government purpose—than that in Van 
Orden.143  
 
 138. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850–51. 
 139. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699–703 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 140.  Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
purpose is analyzed in the effect prong, but is not dispositive). 
 141.  Id. at 1162–63. 
 142. Id. at 1163–64. 
 143. Duncan provides an extremely poor case for establishing the baseline for when 
history and context will overcome a clearly secular government purpose. In contrast, Trunk v. 
City of San Diego, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), provides a useful contrast 
and a situation that illustrates the type of historical and contextual factors that should be 
present to overcome an undeniably secular government purpose. In Trunk, it was not the mere 
use of the Latin cross as the primary element of the war memorial that overcame an admittedly 
secular congressional purpose in purchasing the monument from the city. Id. at *43–44. 
Instead, the Trunk court stated its analysis was driven by other factors, including the 
memorial’s physical dominance of the other memorial elements, id. at *69, *71–72, its 
location and visibility from a major interstate, id. at *71, and its history as an exclusively 
religious symbol for over forty years, which then sat alone as a memorial for thirty-five more, 
id. at *2, *56–57. Further, San Diego had a history of anti-Semitism and religious 
discrimination toward non-Christians. Id. at *68–70.  
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D. Utah’s Demographics 
Finally, the Duncan court cites County of Allegheny v. ACLU144 
for the proposition that a state may establish a religion using the 
religious symbol of a minority religion in the state, and thus 
downplays the importance of Utah’s religious context.145 However, 
in its analysis, the Tenth Circuit once again understates the potential 
importance of the purpose factor while ignoring that the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the situation posed by Duncan.146  
In Allegheny, the Supreme Court held that the use of an 
eighteen-foot tall menorah sitting outside the city-county building 
was constitutional considering its context (sitting next to a forty-five-
foot Christmas tree).147 The Court stated in dicta that an unadorned, 
standalone menorah may have been unconstitutional even though 
adherents of the Jewish religion were a minority, thus establishing 
the proposition that a government could conceivably endorse a 
minority religion.148 However, it is simply unclear what the court 
would have done had the menorah been adorned with secular 
features, such as a large “Happy Holidays from the City of 
Pittsburg” sign across the center of the menorah (similar to the 
prominent display of the trooper name on the cross’s crossbar, along 
with the official UHP insignia) bounded by small Christmas trees or 
other secular items on either side (similar to the trooper picture and 
biography), which is a more apt analogy to the use of the cross in 
Duncan—adorned by secular features in a state where only a small 
minority of the residents revere the cross. 
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s approach in understating the 
importance of Utah’s religious demographics stands in stark contrast 
to the importance the Ninth Circuit placed on the religious history 
and demographics of San Diego in Trunk.149 There, the Ninth 
Circuit placed particular importance on the fact that the cross at issue 
in Trunk stood at a prominent place in La Jolla, a place where being 
 
 144.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989). 
 145. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163–64 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 n.64, 634, 655). 
 146. See id. at 1164 (“These factors that Defendants point to as secularizing the 
memorials do not sufficiently diminish the crosses’ message of government’s endorsement of 
Christianity.”). 
 147. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 582. 
 148. Id. at 616 n.64, 634, 655. 
 149. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 53, at *64–66 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 
2011). 
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religious is essentially synonymous with being Christian, and which 
had a “history of anti-Semitism that reinforces the Memorial’s 
sectarian effect.”150 In contrast, the cross at issue in Duncan is not 
even used as a religious symbol of the predominant religion in 
Utah.151  
Considering the secular history and context of the display in 
Duncan, and the secular purpose surrounding its creation, this factor 
should weigh more heavily against finding an impermissible effect 
under Lemon than the Tenth Circuit conceded. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit is likely to continue to face Establishment 
Clause challenges similar to the one at issue in Duncan.152 To ensure 
that future decisions are not based on its errors, Duncan should be 
reversed. The Court should hold that the crosses at issue would not 
create an impermissible effect of endorsement of a particular religion 
in the eyes of a reasonable observer because of the secular nature of 
the crosses’ history as memorials honoring the fallen dead, the 
secular context in which the Duncan crosses were displayed (as fully 
integrated in a memorial honoring fallen UHP troopers), the 
purpose of the memorial’s creators, and the religious demographics 
of the state of Utah.  
Steven Michael Lau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150. Id. at *64. 
 151. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1163–64. Indeed, it would be ironic if a state using the 
“preeminent symbol of Christianity,” id. at 1160 (internal citation omitted), to memorialize 
fallen troopers was held to be endorsing Christianity where the mainstream Christian world 
rejects Mormonism, the state’s predominant religion. RICHARD ABANES, INSIDE TODAY’S 
MORMONISM: UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S LATTER-DAY SAINTS IN LIGHT OF BIBLICAL 
TRUTH 253 (2004). 
 152. See Forster, supra note 2, at 402. 
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